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Abstract 
Vulnerability assessment (e.g., vulnerability identification and exploitation; also referred 
to as penetration testing) is a relatively mature industry, although attempting to keep pace 
with the diversity of computing and digital devices that need to be examined is 
challenging. Hence, there has been interest in exploring the potential of artificial 
intelligence in enhancing penetration testing and vulnerability identification of systems, 
as evidenced by the systematic literature review performed in this paper. In this review, 
we focus only on empirical papers, and perform a meta-analysis of the located literature. 
Based on the findings, we identify a number of potential research challenges and 
opportunities, such as scalability and the need for real-time identification of exploitable 
vulnerabilities.  
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1. Introduction 
Artificial intelligence (AI) is a fairly established research area. For example, AI was 
reportedly first formally established as a scientific research field by Dartmouth college’s 
summer research project in 1956, which attempted to enable computational devices to solve 
complex problems [1]. In recent years, there have been increasing interests and attempts to 
utilize and adapt AI, such as machine learning (ML) techniques, in various disciplines, such 
as engineering, science and business, and everyday applications [2],[3]. Ayodele [4], for 
example, attempts to categorize existing ML algorithms, based on their outcomes.  
Similar to other areas of research, there are a number of potential research challenges and 
opportunities relating to modern AI and ML techniques [5], [6], [7], including in cyber 
security applications [8], [9], [10]. In recent times, there have also been attempts to integrate 
or utilize AI and ML techniques (in this paper, both AI and ML terminologies are used 
interchangeably) in identifying vulnerabilities in systems that can be exploited, for example 
to facilitate covert data exfiltration.  
Vulnerability identification and exploitation, also referred to as vulnerability assessment or 
penetration testing (pentesting) in the literature, comprises a range of different activities that 
can also be used to inform or enhance the mitigation strategies for a system [11],[12]. For 
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example, pentesting (in this paper, pentesting, vulnerability assessment, and vulnerability 
identification and exploitation, are also used interchangeably) can be used to facilitate 
information gathering (reconnaissance) to understand and assess the current state of a system, 
or more maliciously to actively exploit a system or network and gain unauthorised / active 
persistence access, for example using backdoors, to the target / vulnerable systems [13]. It is 
increasingly challenging to perform penetration tests due to the complexity and heightened 
security of the systems, as well as increased security awareness of system, software and 
hardware developers and security professionals [14]. Hence, one observed trend is in 
intelligence-oriented pentesting [15].  
While there have been attempts to leverage AI and ML techniques in pentesting activities 
[18], [19], there is a lack of a systematic literature review (SLRs) or meta-analysis of existing 
literature. For example, Dogan et al. [16] and  Hydara [17] performed SLRs on various 
aspects of penetration testing, but not AI/ML. Hence, this is a gap we seek to contribute to in 
this paper. Specifically, in this paper, we will systematically analyse existing AI / ML 
techniques utilised for penetration testing, focusing on the different applications and their 
performance. Moreover, we perform a meta-analysis of the located materials, and group these 
different algorithms, techniques and frameworks. Based on the findings, we conclude the 
paper with potential research opportunities. 
In the next section, we will describe our literature review methodology. In Sections 3 and 
4, we discuss the findings from our literature review and potential research agenda, before 
concluding the paper in Section 5.  
 
2. Research Methodology 
To aid in the collection of relevant studies, a set of search strings was constructed by 
extrapolating the research key terms, such as “penetration testing” and “pentesting”. Different 
combinations of the title, abstract and keywords were manually assessed with the aim of 
focusing only on papers most relevant to the study, acquired from research databases listed in 
Table 1. For instance, when we searched using Google Scholar, we included “-
site:books.google.com” to remove any books from the search. We also excluded citations and 
patents during our Google Scholar searches (see also Table 1). The search queries were 
conducted on 16th of February 2018. The located papers then underwent a snowballing 
process, in which references of these located papers were studied to locate find other relevant 
papers. The snowballing process occurred for both backward and forward lookups, and was 
finalised once we determined that all, if not most, papers relating to this study were found. 
Following this initial dataset construction, inclusion and exclusion criteria were applied to the 
entire dataset that allowed the dataset to be refined to only those most relevant papers (see 
also Table 2).  
 
Table 1: Search query variation within each database 
   
Database Name Search Query Return 
Value 
Google Scholar "penetration testing" OR pentesting "penetration-testing" OR 
"vulnerability assessment" AND "artificial intelligence" OR "artificial-
intelligence" OR "neural network" OR "neural-network" OR AI -
"geotechnical" -site:books.google.com 
163 
IEEE Explore (Title only as 
metadata gave ambiguous 
results) 
(("Publication Title":"penetration testing" OR "pentesting" OR 
"penetration-testing" OR "vulnerability assessment") AND ("Publication 
Title":"artificial intelligence" OR "machine learning" OR "machine-
learning" OR "neural network" OR "neural-network" OR "artificial-
intelligence" OR "AI"))  
2 
 3 
ACM Digital Library (+"penetration-testing" +OR +pentesting +OR +"penetration testing" 
+OR +"vulnerability assessment" +AND +"artificial intelligence" +OR 
+AI +OR +"neural-networks" +OR +"neural networks" +OR 
+"machine learning" +OR +"machine-learning") 
11 
Science Direct ( "machine learning" OR "machine-learning" OR ai OR "neural 
network" OR "neural-network" OR "artificial intelligence" OR 
"artificial-intelligence" ) AND ( "penetration testing" OR "penetration-
testing" OR pentesting OR "vulnerability assessment" OR "vulnerability-
assessment" ) [All Sources(Computer Science)]. 
278 
Web of Science TS=( "machine learning"  OR  "machine-learning"  OR  ai  OR  "neural 
network"  OR  "neural-network"  OR  "artificial intelligence"  OR  
"artificial-intelligence" )  AND  TS=( "penetration testing"  OR  
"penetration-testing"  OR  pentesting  OR  "vulnerability assessment"  
OR  "vulnerability-assessment" ) 
58 
Scopus TITLE-ABS-KEY("machine learning" OR "machine-learning" OR AI OR 
"neural network" OR "neural-network" OR "artificial intelligence" OR 
"artificial-intelligence") AND TITLE-ABS-KEY("penetration testing" OR 
"penetration-testing" OR pentesting OR "vulnerability assessment" OR 
"vulnerability-assessment") 
151 
 
 
 
  
2.1 Filtration of Relevant Studies 
Duplicate papers found within each of the database datasets were removed. To ensure the 
relevance of the papers, both inclusion and exclusion criteria were established. Specifically,  
• The paper must focus on AI / ML, with direct applications to penetration testing or 
vulnerability assessment.  
• The paper must include an empirical study, where data is collected and analysed, for 
example in case studies or technical evaluations of current AI / ML techniques for 
penetration testing and vulnerability assessment. In other words, there must be some 
measurable / prediction outcomes that can be quantified and compared with other 
outcomes from other approaches or techniques. Examples of suitable prediction 
outcomes include false positive rate, and learning time required for the system. 
• The paper will also be included if it contains some system that incorporates partial 
applications of AI / ML.  
• The paper must be either a peered review conference or journal paper, and published 
in the English language.  
 
Studies that contain AI but do not adequately encompass penetration testing or 
vulnerability assessment (e.g., making generalisations of the AI / ML model having 
applications towards penetration testing and vulnerability assessment) were excluded. For 
example, algorithms that do not inherently show aspects of “learning” were excluded from 
our study – see also Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
 
Inclusion Criteria 
1. The paper must focus on AI / ML, with direct applications to penetration testing or vulnerability 
assessment.  
2. The paper must include an empirical study, where data is collected and analysed, for example in case 
studies or technical evaluations of current AI / ML techniques for penetration testing and vulnerability 
assessment. In other words, there must be some measurable / prediction outcomes that can be quantified 
and compared with other outcomes from other approaches or techniques. Examples of suitable prediction 
outcomes include false positive rate, and learning time required for the system. 
 4 
3. The paper will also be included if it contains some system that incorporates partial applications of AI / 
ML.  
The paper must be either a peered review conference or journal paper, and published in the English language.  
Exclusion Criteria 
1. Studies that focus on areas other than AI even though they may related to penetration testing and/or 
vulnerability assessment, such as automated code generation or linear code-based algorithms that do not 
incorporate any AI techniques. 
2. Unpublished papers that are uploaded to archive or the conference version of an extended journal paper. 
3. Papers in a different language from that of English and grey literature that is not recognised as a 
reputable source of research (e.g., predatory conferences and journals). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2. Quality Assessment 
To ensure that all the primary studies found contained suitable information for analysis and 
were relevant to the research area, a quality assessment was constructed. This quality 
assessment was built on the guidelines of Kitchenham and Charters [20], recommended by 
Hosseini et al. [21]. These guidelines were altered to match the context of this research area, 
but for the most part, the structure of the questions is still similar. The quality assessment is 
broken down into smaller stages to systematically check the quality of each of the papers in 
turn. Every paper in this study was reviewed using the following criteria to determine if the 
quality of the papers met that needed for analysis. Only once a paper had met all the criterion 
below would it be included for analysis. 
Stage 1: Algorithm construction or application – In order to be applicable to the study, 
the paper must include the process of building or applying an AI / ML concept to an area of 
penetration testing or vulnerability assessment. Furthermore, if the AL / ML algorithm or 
concept undergoes a training period, the training period must be sustainable and include a 
varied range of training data so that it can be adequately compared. Similar to approaches 
based on neural networks, ML, genetic algorithms and other pattern identifying approaches 
were taxonomized under the broad umbrella of AI in this study. The taxonomy is justified by 
referring purposefully to the Oxford English Dictionary definition that AI “is the theory and 
development of computer systems able to perform tasks normally requiring human 
intelligence, such as visual perception, speech recognition, decision making, and translation 
between languages” [22]. This definition outlines the general abstract classification of AI in 
the wider community, therefore in this context the classification of other concepts like that of 
ML and neural networks for example, should be deemed acceptable. 
Stage 2: Context – Context data must be supplied within the paper, such as the granular 
details of the programming language to execute the paper’s proposed solution used to process 
the data within the AI concept. 
Stage 3: Algorithm details – This criterion is the most quintessential for analysis as it 
involves the analysis of both independent and dependent variables and whether they are 
clearly established and reported in the paper itself. If a paper is evaluated quantitatively, the 
paper must contain both and independent and dependent variable to be deemed applicable. 
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Stage 4: Data – Information regarding the datasets used for the assessment of the model 
must be explicitly outlined. If private datasets are used, it is necessary to explain the 
composition of this data and how it has been standardised for use in an AI scenario. 
Stage 5: Performance – The performance of each of the models, algorithms or 
applications must be measured and presented accurately within the paper.  
2.3. Data Extraction 
Studies that had proven to fare well in the quality assessment criteria were then passed for 
data extraction. To systemically carry out the data extraction a data extraction form was 
created comprising three sections, namely: contextual data, qualitative data and quantitative 
data. If the data extraction form was adequately populated with relevant and comparable 
qualitative and quantitative data, it would be then deemed suitable for further analysis. 
Context data: This data includes data of context such as the type of penetration testing or 
vulnerability assessment domain that the study is focused on, as well as the aims of the study 
and various other types of data pertaining to the context. 
Qualitative data: The qualitative data section regards the overall findings and conclusions 
of the study itself. Due to the nature of some papers only displaying and recording qualitative 
measures of performance, this section will be used to encompass results where no numeric 
values are recorded. One example of qualitative data is a reference to the intuitive nature of a 
proposed solution, which may be a subjective comment passed by the authors. Other 
examples may include the responses of test subjects regarding the effectiveness of a solution. 
Quantitative data: Clearly the quantitative data refers to the numeric results formulated 
by the study of the dependant variables. Only numeric data that formed results and could be 
sufficiently compared to other studies was obtained. Examples include false positive rate of 
the algorithms. 
 
In a number of papers, a qualitative approach is better suited if the authors are not making a 
direct comparison with another solution; therefore, general comments can be made on 
whether the solution achieved its desired aims. In essence, if a paper is reviewing the 
responses of security analysis using a newly developed piece of software, this is more 
appropriately managed with qualitative classifications and analysis, as opposed to the binary 
yes or no response. Naturally, in other instances, purely quantitative data, such as time 
required by a solution to solve a problem, or the number of vulnerabilities found, is more 
effectively analysed using numerical values, giving each solution a foundation from which to 
compare [23]. 
2.4 Data Analysis 
There are many challenges faced when synthesising the data within this study due to the 
range of different algorithms, models and frameworks that are used to integrate AI in 
penetration testing and vulnerability assessment. These challenges are only exacerbated by 
the metric (independent variables) used to assess each of their performances. In some 
instances, the quantitative data associated with the performance indicators needed to be 
contextualised to be compared with other papers. It is suggested to attempt to cross-analyse 
each of the different models within their contexts to give insight, as appose to ignoring the 
model because it does not fit into that comparison criteria [21]. It is therefore important to 
identify the threats of cross-analysis between different contexts within this research area. 
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In additional to the collation of the quantitative and qualitative, a meta-analysis was 
performed so that AI techniques could be compared in their application to penetration testing 
and vulnerability assessment. To compare the entire range of different algorithms with their 
respect performance, a qualitative overview was taken based on the contextual standing of all 
the studies within the dataset. Aspects such as performance, efficiency at finding shortest 
path, and training period are just some of the comparison components being analysed. In 
addition, the reputation standing of the papers will be brought into question where necessary 
to properly assess the credibility of the study. 
As a side note, none of the algorithms or applications were replicated with a means of 
confirming the validity of the studies, this was outside of the scope for this systematic 
literature review. 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
After applying the range of database queries across all the academic databases a total of 663 
papers were found. A large quantity of these papers was duplicated due to the nature of some 
of the more holistic databases like Google Scholar and Web of Science which call upon other 
databases within their queries. After removing the duplicated a total of 214 unique papers 
remained. Following the removal of duplicate papers, the inclusion and exclusion criteria was 
applied to the abstract and title of each of the papers within the remaining dataset. Proceeding 
this criterion, the total number of papers was brought down to 17. To gain more papers 
relevant to the research area, backwards and forwards snowballing was utilised. After 
snowballing was applied an additional 14 relevant studies were found. These papers were 
then read in full to assess their relevance to the study, again using the inclusion/exclusion 
criteria (fortunately all papers selected fitted this criterion). 31 total relevant studies were 
found. It should be noted that this small dataset of papers is due to this emerging area of 
leveraging AI in penetration testing and vulnerability assessment. The lack of any relevant 
literature reviews in this area also supports this observation. We also note that the stringent 
and comprehensive nature of the inclusion, exclusion and quality assessment criteria may 
have also excluded papers with some relevance to the subject. 
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Each of the papers was quantified respective of the year they were published in, to develop an 
understanding of the trends that has occurred over the recent period with regards to this 
research area. Figure 1 outlines the recorded tally of papers for each year of publication with 
the addition of a trendline to emphasise the distribution rate over the period, subsequently 
showing the rate of interest for this area of research. The trendline outlines a gradual rise in 
recent years regarding the interest of AI in penetration testing and vulnerability assessment, 
thus showing that interest is slowly increasing. This is reflected once again by the percentage 
of papers (51.61% - 16 papers) that has been published in the current decade (2010 onwards). 
Interestingly, out of the 31 total papers, 21 papers (67.74%) are conference papers, with the 
remaining 10 papers (32.26%) being peered reviewed journal papers. These results are 
indicative of the maturity of the research area, showing that area is still very much in its 
infancy relative to more established research topics. 
A large number of papers incorporated the use of partially observable markov decision 
process (POMDP) and/or planning domain definition language (PDDL), which suggested 
that these attributes are a particularly applicable area of application within this field of study. 
Due to the prevalence of these attributes within this research area, attention will be paid to 
them during the modelling techniques section of this analysis (Section 3.2.). The distribution 
of the different areas of AI within penetration testing and vulnerability assessment is 
exhibited in the heatmap below (Table 3). This heatmap is a generalisation of each of the 
areas, as naturally all the papers have developed their own solutions that vary slightly in their 
composition. 
 
Figure 1: The rate of interest toward AI in penetration testing and vulnerability 
assessment. 
 8 
Table 3: Heatmap distribution of AI disciplines 
within Penetration testing and vulnerability 
assessment. 
  
Knowledge Base and Inference Engine 1 
Contingent planning using PDDL 9 
Genetic Programming 4 
Unsupervised Learning 1 
MDP (POMDP) (Reinforcement Learning) 9 
Analia (Consensus) 1 
Attack Simulation 2 
Attack Graphs / Trees 6 
OVAL 1 
Genertia Red Teams (GRT) 2 
 
Due to the restriction on the number of referenes (no more than 25 for this journal), we refer 
interested reader to our Github link1 the research papers and calculations carried out in this 
paper. 
 
3.1  Performance comparison in relation to Independent Variables (IV). 
A range of independent variables (IV) are used to assess the proficiency of proposed systems 
within the evaluated research area. Under the consideration that some systems are somewhat 
analogous with others not being applicably comparable this section will compare only those 
papers with similar metrics, however it should be noted that despite the differences in 
approaches, all papers selected have a similar objective, this objective being; furthering the 
research area of penetration testing and vulnerability assessment with the use of AI methods. 
As summarised in Table 4, the range of metrics used to assess the proficiency of an AI 
application within the penetration testing domain varies greatly. Despite the range of metrics, 
most of papers within the dataset chose very unequivocal means of testing their proposed 
systems, thus independent variables were very succinct leading to a more identifiable 
objective for the dependent variables to aspire to. Many of the studies within the dataset use 
common independent variables, however studies differ in their measurement of the dependant 
variable and therefore cannot be compared in the same context. 
 
 
                                               
1 https://github.com/deanuniversityofsalford/Systematic-Literature-Review---AI-in-Penetration-testing-and-
vulnerability-assessment. 
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Table 4: Studies and their respective metrics (Independent Variables (IVs) 
  
Type of Metrics (Independent Variables) Studies (see footnote 1) 
Problem Size (also outlined by an increased size difficult under Plan 
Generation Step) 
[S5], [S17], [S21], [S26] 
Number of hosts in exposure (measure of how long it takes for a sample 
size to be compromised or solved in relation to exploitation steps). 
[S9], [S10], [S14], [S15], [S18], 
[S22], [S23], [S24] 
Genetic generation (by measure of generation and effective outcome). [S3], [S27], [S28], [S29], [S30] 
Training Epoch [S12] 
Network State (Hosts, Vulnerabilities and software) or Network State 
(Device type) 
[S1], [S2], [S4], [S8], [S11] 
Number of objectives [S31] 
Action Model [S13], [S16] 
AI engine [S6] 
Connectivity [S7] 
Vulnerabilities [S19], [S20], [S25] 
 
A small handful of studies ([S5], [S17], [S21], [S26]) use a common IV to assess the 
performance of their proposed AI intelligence implementation, this IV being the size 
(network) of the problem presented to the AI solution (note: the “generation step” within 
studies [S5] & [S17] refer to an increased size difficulty with regards to testing). Figure 2 
outlines the results of each of these papers, highlighting the performance respectively. 
Fortuitously, each of these studies also uses the logarithmic base 10 axis measurement to 
show the exponential growth in the dependant variable (in this case time). This undoubtedly 
shows that the higher the complexity of the problem (more complicated vulnerable network) 
given to the AI solution, the more complex and time consuming the solution must be to solve 
the problem (essentially finding exploits for each of the units on the network). For the most 
part these four studies show similar results in terms of solving the problem of build efficient 
attack graphs applicable to their problems. 
Interestingly, both [S5] and [S17] supplement their processes with the liberal use of 
PDDL or Planning Domain Definition Language, however the application is used in entirely 
different ways, thus showing that studies using plan generation in conjunction with PDDL do 
not directly perform better than those that don’t with regards to speed of generation. The 
outcome, as seen in Figure 2, show a rapid acceleration of action planning in [S5], before 
levelling out to somewhat mimic the results of [S17]. This evidently shows that the cFF or 
Contingent Fast Forward planning process of FIDIUS within [S5] is superior in application to 
that of LPG-td (Local search for Planning Graphs) planner of [S17]. 
[S26] uses a pruning technique to optimise the decision-making process of the algorithm 
itself, making the decision points of each of the attack graphs easier to compute. This 
evidently has aided in the construction of optimised attack graphs, especially when compared 
to the results of [S21]. It can be assumed that although the results are only recorded up until a 
problem size (network size) of 4, the existing results can be extrapolated to inevitably show 
that [S21] performs exponentially worse than [S26]. This inherently shows that optimisation 
is key when working with exponentially increasing metrics or in this case “problem sizes”. 
 
 10 
  
[S5] [S17] 
 
 
[S21] [S26] 
  
Figure 2: Showing comparable results with studies that use problem size as an IV. 
 
Another small set of studies ([S3], [S27], [S28] & [S30]) take an entirely different approach 
to the sentient application of software to solve problems regarding penetration testing and 
vulnerability assessment. These studies facilitate the use of evolution to achieve the most 
applicable means of determining the best plan of action to take to compromise the proposed 
system(s). Much like most genetic algorithms, fitness is the metric used to determine how 
well suited an outcome is to the process at hand. In the studies described above fitness is 
defined in various ways relevant to the independent variable. Both [S27] and [S28] for 
instance use the process of presenting the genetic algorithm with malicious packets so that the 
system “learns” of the requirements needed to avoid detection within the system (avoidance 
level is unequivocal to that of fitness level). As previously mentioned, the fitness of studies 
[S3] and [S30] is defined in a different way despite the overall concept of fitness being 
relative to how effective an outcome is at solving the problem at hand. Studies [S3] and [S30] 
both define fitness as a means of developing strategies to best solve the exploitation of a 
system within the environment given. 
The way in which the application of these models differs with regards to the independent 
variables is that [S3] and [S30] describe the independent variable as a generation evolution 
i.e. the variant of code within the solution is the determining factor of its fitness (dependent 
variable), as appose to [S27] and [S28] in which it is the variation of data presented to the 
algorithm which facilitates the measure of the fitness.  
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[S27] [S28] 
  
[S3] [S30] 
  
Figure 3: Showing comparable results with genetic studies that comparable IVs. 
 
[S29] also made use of fitness as a DV in relation to generation as an IV, however a mean 
fitness level was taken after a multitude of tests, thus this could not be compared graphically 
with its respective literary peers. The independent variable associated with [S29] is 
comparable to the generation variable of both [S3] and [S30], in which new generations of 
solutions are put forward for testing and evolved depending on the fitness level reached by 
the solution, thus changing the independent variable being measured. In all 3 studies ([S3], 
[S29] & [S30]), the independent variable of generation is synonymous of the length of the 
solution put forward. Using generation length appears to be a desirable metric when 
producing a gradual development of fitness, in contrast to generative evolution which appears 
to spike rapidly, then levelling out on a plateau with no evident signs of improvement. 
Contrary to the other studies, [S9] & [S10] make use of two independent variables as a means 
of testing the attack planning efficiency of their POMDP models. [S9] shows promising 
results using small-scale metrics for the independent variables, showing an increase in time 
exertion towards a higher host and exploit quantity. [S9] concludes by raising the issue of 
scaling as a new problem that limits POMDP in its application to penetration testing and 
vulnerability assessment. 
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[S9] [S10] 
  
Figure 4: Showing comparable results for studies that utilise multiple IVs. 
 
The subject of scalability is also prevalent in [S10], as [S10] shows that the application of 
POMDP does not scale well with the consolidated addition of the proposed 4AL model in 
respect to the extension of the independent variables. However, as outlined by the authors of 
this study, the scaling issue may be a result of encapsulation the entire attack solution for the 
dataset into a single POMDP. Therefore, these results show that when testing POMDPs 
within a penetration testing or vulnerability assessment capacity, that scalability should be 
taken into consideration, with independent variables extending to a large capacity to test the 
AI component to its maximum potential. [S6] does in fact use multiple IVs; the network type, 
the goal of the exploitation and the engine being used. [S6] is not able to be compared with 
[S9] and [S10], due to the small number of hosts on the test networks and difference in goals. 
  
[S15] [S22] 
  
[S24] [S23] 
  
Figure 5: Studies within similar metrics based on machine exposure size. 
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Studies ([S15], [S22], [S23] and [S24]) all use a similar metric when testing their proposed 
tools and models. These studies use the quantity of machines exposed to the tool/model as a 
base for comparison against the quantity of time needed to overcome each specified quantity 
of machines. [S15] and [S22] appear to have similar results respective of their IVs, despite 
using entirely different models in application of AI. However, the performance of [S24] is far 
more effective at compromising machines in the comparison of these independent variables, 
despite the different in size with regards to the independent variable. As a means of further 
comparing these the effectiveness of this study, this IV should be extended to reflect the other 
studies. It should be noted that in this comparison [S23] uses a logarithmic Base 10 scale to 
captivate the exponential rise in time needed to compromise each unit of ten machines. This 
scale in conjunction with the small ranged metric of machines demonstrates that the AI 
application within this study is by far the most ineffective of those with similar metrics. Other 
similar metrics relating to the exposure size mentioned above include that of [S31], in which 
the authors use the IV of the number of exploit objectives required in each of the tests done, 
measuring the time taken to find a solution for these objectives. 
S8 abstractly relates to these metrics also, however, specific network configurations were 
used as an independent variable as appose to the size of the hosts within a network (although 
this may have been applicable somewhat applicable, due to the size of each of the respective 
test networks in this study). This abstract relation is also true of study [S14], in which the 
number of hosts is the independent variable, however it is the coverage and number of exploit 
that are discovered for each host (as appose to exploitation) that is under measurement.  
A large quantity of the studies ([S20], [25], [19], [11], [2], [1], [16], [18], [13]) use their 
own test networks (bespoke networks, tailored for their own needs) to assess the performance 
of their proposed solution. The fundamental problem related to this is that it is difficult to 
gauge the exact difficulty of the test networks used in each of the samples and therefore 
comparisons between different studies prove difficult. For example; what constitutes as an 
easy network in one study may not be so easily solved by another algorithm, therefore 
making the results subject only to the model proposed in that individual study. 
Study [S12] utilises the training period as its independent variable, with the exposure to 
the training period being utilised to test the damage that may be caused by this. Surprisingly, 
this is one of the only studies that actively uses a training period as the influencing variable 
within the dataset despite the strong connotations of learning and training in AI. 
Respectively, this may be because it is one of few studies within the dataset that actively 
produces DDoS attacks as a means of testing the network itself. 
3.2. Analysis of Modelling techniques. 
The application of AI within penetration testing and vulnerability assessment manifests itself 
in a variety of different forms. For the most part, many models appear to encompass some 
degree of attack planning, be it through attack graph generation, attack tree modelling or 
other forms of planning. Table 5 illustrates the different models of each of the studies, with 
each study taxonomized based on a general overview of its respective model.  
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Table 5: Studies and their respective models. 
  
Technique Studies 
 MulVAL [S21], [S24] 
NuSMV (Model Checker) [S19], [S20] 
POMDP (Partially Observed 
Markov Decision Process.) 
[S2], [S6], [S8], [S9], [S10], [S13], [S14], [S16], [S26] 
MIPSA (Mixed Initiative 
Planning and Scheduling Agent). 
[S25] 
FF (+ cFF) Planner [S5], [S22], [S23], [S31] 
SGPlan (planner) [S18],  
Genetic evolution [S3], [S27], [S28], [S29], [S30] 
Reinforcement Learning (RL) [S12] 
Host Clustering [S4], [S7] 
Multiple Models [S1], [S11], [S15], [S17] 
 
Most of studies that focus on attack graph generation and exploitation preplanning use two 
predominant AI methods to facilitate this functionality. These being the Markov Decision 
Process (MDP) in some capacity (often in a partially observable study in which the user can 
influence some aspects of the output - POMDP) and genetic algorithms that generate 
solutions through iterations of generational fitness. This reflects that these AI techniques may 
be accepted solutions within the research circles of this domain. In addition to these core 
techniques, [S5], [S22], [S23] and [S31] all make use of the fast-forward (FF) with some 
making use of the contingent fast-forward (cFF) model to complement their application. All 
models using these processes to generate attack plans outperform any other model within 
their comparison group. All papers conclude that the use of fast-forward planning allows for 
the creation of shorter attack paths with contingent options being supplemented if required 
(with a longer lead time naturally). 
Other studies, such as [S26] use SPUDD (Stochastic Planning using Decision Diagrams) 
in conjunction with MDP (mentioned above), this combination outperforms UID 
(unconstrainted influence diagrams) in [S21] (which makes use of MulVAL, the main area of 
research for [S24]), with both models translating attack graphs into their respective models. 
UID does appear to scale better than those models which use MDP based algorithms, as a 
slower rise (not exponential like that of MDP) in the required time is noted over the 
increasing size of the network. Unfortunately, due to the network size tested, it is difficult to 
determine if the UID model maintains a stable solution in terms of scalability. 
For the most part, models that use MDP all suffer from scalability issues with regards to 
attack graphs. One prime example of this is [S9], in which a knowledge base is used in 
conjunction with POMDP to generate exploits for a small number of hosts. As the host 
number gets higher, towards end of the study the time needed to find exploits for these 
devices grows exponentially. [S10] (using the same base model), tries to remediate the 
scalability issue using an additional 4AL Decomposition Algorithm to refine and create 
policies for each of the attack graph scenarios. This does not work however, as the issue of 
scalability is not resolved, only made worse. [S14] is another example, however in this study 
the authors limit the model to a 30-minute testing time, ensuring that the attack graph does 
not grow out of control. This does not fix the issue of scalability however. Other studies like 
[S26], make use of pruning techniques to increase the efficiency of attack graph generation. 
[S26] also makes a point of simulating a real-world environment in which the attack graphs it 
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creates take it to account the interaction with honey pots (no other attack graph generation 
utilise this sort of sensibility). 
Other studies make use of MDP to develop attack graphs and/or trees to enable the 
construction of adversary profiles. Studies like that of [S6] use classical planning through a 
composition of MDP and Monte Carlo simulations to develop and build attack graphs. 
However, due to small dataset tested by this study, it is difficult to determine if this bespoke 
algorithm suffers from the issue of scalability. Due to the centralised use of MDP to develop 
the algorithm it could be extrapolated that this is certainly the case. 
In contrast to MDP models that use classical planning, [S8] advocates the use of 
contingent planning over classic planning, concluding the use of contingent planning 
(essentially sensing outcomes that could potentially be, as oppose to marking all potential 
actions as a viable path) is predominately more efficient. [S22] uses a bespoke planning 
algorithm based off a range of other algorithms, incorporating PDDL consolidation to ensure 
that the issue of scaling in attack graph creation is properly mitigated against, which 
inevitably worked to an extent but requires more testing to develop a comprehensive 
conclusion regarding the model. 
Other studies that address the performance issues of POMDP generation models, are that 
of [S2], which structures its objectives on the refinement of the POMDP based approaches to 
enable the scalability and general performance of these models to be effective in real world 
environments. [S2] proposes a range of different optimisation criteria including budget 
optimisation and fault tolerances, again progress is made in optimising the system, but 
nothing solid is concluded. The authors do however highlight the need for real network 
testing to enable them to draw conclusions as to the increase in efficiency of their proposed 
optimisation.  
Two studies ([S20] and [S19]) both make use of the NuSMV (model checking) which 
both comprehensively check attack graph generation to determine the viability of the 
proposed graph. Once an attack graph is generated [S20] analyses the results to determine the 
most reliable path available. This process, as denoted by the authors is extremely time 
consuming and does not scale well. Conversely, [S19] shortens attack chains to the shortest 
path to ensure that exponential explosion (scalability issue) does not occur with regards to 
decision branches within the graphs themselves. The time-consuming overhead of [S20] may 
also be a result of the model generation and mapping of the initial network to generate the 
foundation for attack graph. 
Many of the studies make use of the PDDL (Planning Domain Definition Language) to 
consolidate and standardise the action needed for attack planning. [S17] makes use of PDDL 
as a means of translating common vulnerabilities and attack platforms into structured attack 
plans. PDDL appears to be the most widely used standardised language for vulnerability 
assessment in this domain. Contrary to the use of PDDL as a planning language for building 
attack graphs and other applications, some models use OVAL (Open Vulnerability 
Assessment Language). For instance, Study [S14] states the declarative descriptions of 
OVAL to be better in their application of creating more centralised knowledge base around 
certain exploits and therefore providing a better means for analysis in comparison to PDDL. 
[S24] also makes use of OVAL, underlining that it is an excellent tool for gathering 
information regarding host configuration, but later stating that it is only a basis for 
information gathering in this respect and needs further refinement. 
 16 
As previously mentioned during the IV section, [S5] outperformed [S17] with this 
performance potentially being attributed to [S5]’s use of the PDDL planning language within 
a knowledge base. This is true for most of the models that incorporate PDDL. [S25] uses 
PDDL translation to provide a more granular and descriptive personalised attack graph that 
allows for a more user specific attack graph to be created, this may not be so easily developed 
with the use of OVAL, as OVAL gives general descriptions regarding exploitations. The use 
of PDDL within [S25] affirms the fact that models that use PDDL perform significantly 
better than those that do not, despite not using MDP. In study [S18], the use of PDDL aids in 
maintaining the shortest path possible for minimal attack graph generation, thus aiding with 
the issue of scalability. 
Stepping away from the use of attack planning, a slightly more unusual AI paradigm in 
the form of genetic evolution algorithms occurs frequently within the dataset of this study. 
Both [S27] and [S28] both make use of GENERTIA Red Teams (GRTs) as a genetic model 
for the foundation of their overall model. In contrast [S3] and [S30] make use of grammatical 
evolution, in which the script or solution is grammatically altered, thus a new generation is 
‘born’. These two groups of genetic studies use different metrics to assess the efficiency of 
their solutions, so it is difficult to assess the performance in relation to each other. However, 
for the most part, all the genetic algorithms within this study perform similarly in that they 
improve significantly over the same generation span, thus showing that no evolutionary 
model is more effective than another in the application of penetration testing and 
vulnerability assessment. 
3.3. Analysis of Evaluation criteria 
The methods in which the performance is measured within the AI in penetration testing and 
vulnerability assessment domain differs greatly. Table 6 shows the full extent of the different 
evaluation techniques used by the studies within the paper. As mentioned in the analysis of 
the Independent Variables, it is difficult to completely compare studies that are similar due to 
the extent of combinations between the IV’s and the evaluation criteria. 
Table 6: Studies with their respective evaluation methods. 
  
Evaluation Criteria Study 
Time (host + vulnerability 
discovery) 
[S15], [S24] 
Time (number of compromises) [S5], [S17], [S21], [S22], [S23], [S26],  
Host / Exploit coverage [S14] 
Fitness (generational) [S3], [S29], [S30] 
Fitness (based on learning model) [S27], [S28] 
Damage [S12] 
Attack steps generated [S19], [S20], [S25],  
Minimal number of steps 
generated 
[S18] 
Level of uncertainty [S13] 
Cluster Deviation [S7] 
Probability of clustered devices [S4] 
Viability of Solution [S1], [S2], [S8], [S11], [S16], [S31], 
Multiple evaluation criteria [S6], [S9], [S10], 
 
As illustrated in Table 6, a large quantity of papers ([S5], [S9], [S10], [S15], [S17], [S21], 
[S22], [S23], [S24], [S26], [S31]) purport to evaluate their models using time as a 
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performance metric. The time evaluation method is often associated with a model’s ability to 
quickly enumerate or exploit a host or number of hosts. Study [S14] follows a similar 
approach to the large quantity of studies that use time to measure performance of 
enumeration or exploitation of a large network. However, differences occur within this study 
as it does not dwell on the time efficiency required to exploit, enumerate or find 
vulnerabilities on the hosts. Instead it focuses on a more fundamental value surrounding the 
total coverage of vulnerabilities on each of the hosts within the dataset, taking a more 
qualitative approach. This study effectively shows that the number of hosts considerably 
affects the model’s ability to find suitable exploitation means to take control of targets. This 
is surely a more imperative goal of a vulnerability assessment agent, than the time that a 
service takes to enumerate a small set of obvious vulnerabilities. 
Upon analysis both studies [S8] and [S31] both have very specific objectives or tasks to 
perform when testing on specific hosts or networks, with both models performing 
considerably well on all the tasks given. In addition to other metrics such as the number of 
actions generated for their proposed solution, both utilise time as an evaluation method. In 
reference to their times in comparison to other models, both have exceedingly fast times for 
enumeration of exploits for their chosen hosts or networks. It is hard to distinguish whether 
the fast times are due to the use of the Fast-Forward metric model (mentioned previously) or 
due to their concentrated efforts on specific scenarios. If the latter is the predominant cause of 
the increased performance, it is perhaps a better and more fortuitous venture to focus research 
efforts in the future on more streamlined and distinct objectives. 
Peculiarly, the evaluation method of [S12] is the damage caused, this is summarised by 
the number of malicious packets being processed by the network. The authors state that the 
primary function of this research was to show that the learning algorithm could improve over 
time, and that the actual recording of the assessment criteria (damage) was not a base for 
comparison. This bespoke evaluation criteria makes comparing this algorithm to other 
learning-based algorithms inherently difficult. Nonetheless, this assessment criteria does offer 
some benefits when evaluating penetration testing and vulnerability assessment models, as 
assessing the overall damage (or increase of damage overtime) may be a more befitting 
method of assessing the overall outcome (or damage) that a potential breach in security may 
cause. 
A range of studies ([S6], [S9], [S10]) use multiple evaluation criteria to assess the 
productivity of their solution. The multiple assessment criteria associated with [S6] allow for 
a more granular assessment of the AI solution. Not only is the time to enumerate the hosts 
recorded, but later stages of the testing such as the number of accounts enumerated and the 
amount of data exfiltrated also included. This multiple stage of recordings allows the authors 
to test the model at multiple stages of the exploitation stage to determine how efficient this 
model is at performing suitable penetration tests. Going forward, testing models at multiple 
stages of the penetration testing scenario may offer better insight into the successes and 
failings of future models on a more granular level. 
4. Meta-Analysis 
Due to the range of metrics and results put forward by models using AI for penetration testing 
and vulnerability assessment, a meta-analysis is needed to combine these studies in a shared 
context, with the addition of appropriately weighting each of the studies to determine the 
overall agreeable conclusion on application of AI in penetration testing and vulnerability 
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assessment. This meta-analysis unlike many others will contain mostly qualitative studying of 
each of the papers. For the most part it is difficult to incorporate all the studies into one 
analysis as there is no standardised basis for testing i.e. every study uses a different network 
to test their solution. To avoid bias during this meta-analysis, all papers, even those that are 
not easily comparable, will be analysed to ensure that the overall picture is given. In an 
addition effort to avoid bias, each paper’s citations (where it is applicable) will be analysed to 
determine the renown of the paper under the premise that papers with high citations will be 
more acceptable as a means for comparison and application than those with a low count. 
To begin, the productivity of [S12] increased by 60% over the training period of the 
study, showing that the training period respectively had a great influence on determining the 
effectiveness of the solution. This paper is the only paper that utilises reinforcement learning 
(MDP based) with a training epoch to solve the problem, thus showing that MDP based 
attack map generation may not be the most productive solution for penetration and 
vulnerability assessment in terms of AI. The credibility of this paper is brought into question 
by the low number of citations (10), despite the paper having a multitude of results. The use 
of reinforcement learning with the addition of the damage report evaluation metric may be 
more applicable to the AI application in this domain, the MDP based attack graph generation. 
Models that perform well are that of [S5], which uses Fast-Forward planner (+FF). The 
results for this model are astounding with multiple layers of testing showing reliable results 
and a respectively small decrease in efficiency over larger networks. In addition, this model 
makes use of both the PDDL and MSF framework (an already consolidated and well-known 
exploit knowledge base), which may have aided in its success. 
Study [S31] uses both PDDL and Fast-Forward planning (+FF), which inevitably lead to 
extraordinary results, the source of the results may be attributed to the combination of these 
two characteristics. The fame of this paper pays homage to its achievements with it being 
cited a total of 99 times. [S23] also uses both PDDL and Fast-Forward planning (+FF), again, 
with outstanding results in comparison to those with MDP/POMDP models. Following on the 
theme of citations this paper has also be cited 42 times. [S18] uses SGPlan, which is a variant 
of Fast-Forward planning (+FF). This study was found to be slightly more efficient than its 
predecessors. 
The NuSMV checker model in [S20] is one of the keystone publications with regards to 
automated generation of attack graphs, having been cited 1,321 times, despite this model is 
highly time consuming. This study gave a good basis for other research in the AI in 
penetration testing and vulnerability assessment domain. A potential contender of MDP is 
study [21], using UID (a combination of MulVAL and OVAL language). The performance of 
the problem solver was extremely good using this combination of attributes. 
In [S6], the authors provide a more realistic basis of AI application in penetration testing 
and vulnerability assessment, stepping away from the conventional exploit search of other 
studies, looking at a more realistic set of actions (i.e. account compromise and data 
exfiltration). However, despite multiple tests being carried out, the overall sample size 
analysed in this study does not give conclusive results regarding the overall application of AI 
in this research area and should therefore be weighted as less influential than other more 
detailed studies, due to being unable to determine if scaling is an issue in this real-world 
application technique. [S24] is one of the few models using the OVAL vulnerability language 
and the MulVAL scanner in comparison to those models that use MDP and PDDL, this 
model is seen as one of the most promising application of intelligent agents and planning 
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within this domain, this is again reflected in the number of times cited (459). A crossover 
occurs within [S14], with this study favouring to use OVAL over PDDL within an MDP 
model. Naturally, scalability issues still ensue, and the overall performance of the model 
suffers when the number of hosts increases.  [S22] uses a bespoke algorithm with the PDDL 
language, which unfortunately does not perform as well as models that use MDP with PDDL 
(This is also the case for [S15]). 
 
As mentioned previously the scalability of POMDP is a giant issue, especially for studies like 
that of [S10] and [S9]. Many papers have tried to mitigate this issue using various techniques. 
[S26] for instance uses pruning to ensure that MDP does not become unscalable, this aids in 
MDP becoming a useful application for large penetration tests, even coming close to rivalling 
the previously discussed MulVAL model. The optimisation efforts of [S2] also allow this 
model to be a contending against MulVAL, however more testing is required with regards to 
this study. CycSec in [S1] may also prove worthy, but the level of testing is limited to small 
networks and cannot be a yet viable solution. In contrast to MDP studies, [S25] using MIPSA 
makes great progress with regards to refining the graph development process, this study also 
uses PDDL. 
 
Finally, genetic algorithms form a small group within the overall group of AI in penetration 
testing and vulnerability assessment. Study [S3], improves fitness by almost 500%, with 
[S30]’s fitness improves by over 300% (this is also true for [S27]). [S28] only improves by 
just under 1 %, but it should be noted that this solution is already running at a near 100% 
fitness value. 
4. Potential Research Directions  
There have also been attempts to achieve scalability to some extent, for example using 
fast-forward (+FF) and contingent fast-forward (+cFF) planning to facilitate attack graph 
planning. However, striking a balance between scalability and effectiveness remains one 
research opportunity, particularly as systems become more complex. 
A number of AI models use detection time as a quantifying metric, for example, in terms 
of seconds or minutes. One potential research direction is to design AI-based approaches to 
identify vulnerabilities that are exploitable, and to what degree, in real-time. 
To achieve optimal performance, we recommend that future solutions should 
probably be designed for the application domain or specific system, rather than been overly 
abstract or generic. Abstract applications, such as those designed to search for or generate 
general exploits over many hosts, may only detect simple or on-the-surface type 
vulnerabilities. Also, future AI models should test multiple stages of their models during the 
different penetration testing stages (e.g., initial compromise compared with post exploitation), 
which is likely to facilitate more realistic simulation and learning. 
We also observed that most studies use testbeds or simulations for evaluation, rather than 
real-world systems. Hence, one potential research opportunity is to design a suite of 
standardised systems / networks that are sufficiently realistic, complex and have features that 
are typical of different real-world applications. This will provide researchers a common 
platform to evaluate and benchmark their approaches (this is analogous to using a common 
dataset to benchmark the various performance metrics of some security approaches). 
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Assessment criteria should also probably move away from time towards more qualitative 
measures, for example “consequence / impact” as a means of determining the effectiveness of 
AI applications (or any other) in penetration testing or vulnerability assessment models. 
 
5. Conclusion  
While the utility of AI in penetration testing and vulnerability assessment has been 
demonstrated in existing studies, we need to keep pace with technological advances and 
evolution of adversarial techniques to avoid detection. In other words, the application of AI in 
vulnerability assessment is expected to be a growing area, and its role and importance will 
increase as systems become more complex in our smart and connected society. 
 Based on our review, we made a number of observations, such as those reported in 
Section 4. For example, one observation made in this paper is that scalability is a key 
challenge, for example in approaches based on POMDP attack graphs and genetic algorithms. 
Genetic algorithms appear to perform better over time in relation to their independent 
variables, due to the nature of generation evolution (since genetic evolution allows one to 
evolve the required solution to a point where it is adept to its environment). This also 
suggests that the application of general AI techniques needs to be carefully considered in the 
context of the application environment, in order to have the best “fitness” required to 
complete the task at hand. Hence, future solutions / approaches should incorporate some 
elements of evolution to produce the best suited or “fittest” solution possible. 
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